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I
INTRODUCTION

A physician's ability to earn a living depends significantly on her
investments in capital. But unlike a manufacturer, whose primary investments
are in physical assets, the physician principally invests in human capitalskills, reputation, and the like-which cannot be transferred easily to
alternative uses. The non-redeployability of her assets makes her particularly
vulnerable to unforeseen circumstances. As unanticipated events occur she
cannot, for instance, protect herself by simply entering the spot market,
selling the investment, taking her profits or losses, and putting the money
elsewhere. Protecting her human capital investment from unforeseen risks
will require a more complex institutional mechanism than simple spot
markets. This article explores a multi-party contractual solution to the
physician's risk problem. This article argues that, handled correctly, the
contracting implicit in the large, multi-specialty group practice provides an
important opportunity for physicians to diversify and protect their portfolio of
human assets.
This is not, however, an article on contract drafting. I do not attempt to
design an ideal contract document. Nor, for that matter, do I assert that all
physicians must diversify their risks. Instead, I suggest that those who are
interested in diversifying their risks should consider carefully the potential
advantages afforded by the multi-party contracting available through group
practice. Similarly, I suggest that physicians already participating in a group
practice or a health maintenance organization ("HMO") I consider structuring
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1. An HMO is essentially an insurance arrangement. As with conventional medical insurance,
the patient pays periodic fixed premiums to the HMO. Unlike the conventional insurer that
reimburses a client for his medical expenses, the HMO actually provides a broad spectrum of medical
services directly to its patients. In a world of increasing complexity, information growth, and
technological change, no physician is capable of providing the full range of services potentially
required by a patient. To offer the comprehensive service required by the HMO, the skills of a wide
range of physicians must be integrated both horizontally and vertically. This article argues that this
integration provides an opportunity for physicians to diversify the risks associated with their
investments in human capital.
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some portion of the practice to take advantage of its risk diversification
potential. As will be seen, achieving risk diversification is conceptually
straightforward.
Because the solution requires a productivity-neutral
compensation

scheme,

however,

it

raises

important

enforcement

and

incentive compatibility issues. Consequently, most of this article is devoted to
using transaction cost analysis to examine the institutional structure required
to support the underlying contract.
This approach is taken because, although contracting parties may carefully
consider the wording of their documents, they often ignore the practical
institutional ramifications of their proposals. Especially if they are
inexperienced, contracting parties are apt to pay scant attention to the
mechanisms by which they intend to enforce, monitor, and adapt their
agreements over time. But there is more to a contract than the wording of the
document. The institutions and relationships supporting the words of an
agreement often influence the actual outcome of the contracting more than
2
do the words themselves.
I refer to the institutional structure associated with the contract as a
governance mechanism. It provides the method by which the parties enforce,
monitor, and adapt their agreement. Good governance structures make for
smooth transactions; the failure of contracting parties to address governance
issues adequately can adversely affect transaction costs. After discussing the
nature of the physician's risk problems and a proposed contractual solution,
this article will demonstrate how physicians or their advisors can accurately
assess governance requirements.
The governance structure necessary to support the multi-physician
contracting described below also illustrates the phenomenon of private
orderings-that is, private government. Most of the health care and
contracting literature implicitly assumes that contracts will be enforced by
courts or markets. But many of the "laws"-that is, norms-that govern
agreements are private in the sense that the parties develop their own
contractual regulations. The literature often fails to distinguish adequately
the circumstances that demand customized, private governance from those
where more generally applicable structures like markets or courts will suffice.
Obviously, not all transactions require specially tailored norms. Certainly
courts and markets provide adequate governance mechanisms for numerous
situations, and neither courts nor markets are derived privately by the parties
to the specific contract. This article argues that the necessity for private
lawmaking in the physician context can be traced back to the nature of the
transaction costs faced by the contracting parties. 3 Transaction costs, quite
2. See generally Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc.
REV. 55 (1963); Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974); Palay, A Contract
Does Not a CONTRACT Make, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 561 (1985).
3. Palay, Relational Contracting, Transaction Cost Economics and the Governance of HMOs, 59 TEMP.
L.Q. 927, 934-38 (1986).
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They are "the

economic equivalent of friction in physical systems" 5 and refer to the human 6
and environmental 7 conditions that make contracting (potentially) costly.
The existence of transaction costs makes governance structures necessary and
requires parties to give thought to the types of governance structures they
use.

The precise nature of the governance mechanism is predictable from those
characteristics of the transaction that give rise to the contracting frictions. 8 In
short, parties will devise or choose the least costly governance arrangement
that best facilitates their exchange. Below, sections of this article identify the
transaction costs faced by physicians, and briefly discuss reasons why private
lawmaking is required to support physicians' diversification agreements. 9
This article then describes in some detail the nature of the private law
required to guarantee physician contracts.
It has been suggested that, in order to effectuate private law of the nature
here described, the parties will require the organizational structure of a
firm. 10 Part V of this article examines organizational alternatives for
4.

JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 91ST CONG.,

EXPENDITURES:

1ST SESS., THE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF PUBLIC

THE PPB SYSTEM 48 (Joint Comm. Print 1969) (Arrow, The Organization of Economic

Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation).
5.
0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 19 (1985).

INSTITUTIONS

OF

CAPITALISM:

FIRMS,

MARKETS,

AND

6. First, human decisionmakers are only rational within limits. They cannot see the future and
have only qualified problem-solving capabilities. In short, they possess what Simon terms "bounded
rationality." See H. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL; MATHEMATICAL ESSAYS ON
RATIONAL HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN A SOCIAL SETTING 196-200 (1957); H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE
BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 39-41, 80-83

(2d ed. 1961).
Second, human decisionmakers can and do act opportunistically. They seek their own selfinterest, and generally prefer more rather than less of most things. They possess a restricted capacity
for gathering, evaluating, and storing information. On the one hand, human beings attempt to
exploit the advantages that may be attained from the making of "false or empty, that is, selfdisbelieved, threats and promises" concerning future conduct. E. GOFFMAN, STRATEGIC INTERACTION

105, 85-145 (1969).
WILLIAMSON,

MARKETS

On the other hand, they distort or selectively disclose information. 0.
AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 26-27 (1975)

[hereinafter 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES].

7. The environment in which these actors interact is often uncertain and complex, yet the
actors are constrained by their bounded rationality in coping with this environment. In addition, the
world of contract is often populated by only a small number of potential buyers and sellers. Where
the participants are few, markets either cannot be relied upon to work correctly, or situations akin to
monopolistic competition develop. Of special interest to transaction cost economists are those
circumstances where a large number of buyers and sellers exist at the outset, but the number is
reduced substantially once initial bargains are set. A situation that appears initially to have the
requisite number of buyers and sellers for a well-functioning market devolves into some form of
monopolistic or small-numbers bargaining environment.
0.
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES, supra note 6, at 22-23.
8. Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics: The Governance of ContractualRelations, 22 J. L. & ECON.
233, 245-54 (1979) [hereinafter Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics]; Palay, supra note 3, at 934-38;
Palay, Organizingan HMO by Contract: Some Transaction Cost Considerations,65 NEB. L. REV. 728, 736-38
(1986) [hereinafter Palay, Organizing].
9. A reader interested in a more detailed discussion of this subject should look to Palay, supra
note 3, at 938-47; Palay, Organizing, supra note 8, at 742-46.
10. Gilson & Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry Into the Corporate
Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313, 338-39 (1985).
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developing the governance structure necessary to support physician
diversification agreements. This article contends that any type of integrated
medical practice will suffice, but that HMO's are particularly well suited to the
task. Finally, this article concludes that integration can be achieved either
formally through a firm, as with a group practice HMO, or informally through
relational contracting, as in an individual practice association ("IPA").
II
THE RISKS OF PHYSICIAN INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL

To earn a living a physician expends resources on three types of human
capital. First she invests in her technical medical skills. These investments
include her initial medical education, her internship, residency, any postresidency fellowships, the experience gained from practice, and any
continuing education programs and seminars she attends.
Second, and perhaps as important, is a physician's investment in her
professional
reputation.
Reputation provides
a mechanism
for
communicating and marketing skills and other attributes." A physician's
reputation also provides information to patients and other doctors about her
qualifications, skill, temperament, and medical philosophy, as well as about
how communicative, responsive, and sensitive to pre-existing doctor-patient
relations she is. For instance, reputation plays an important role in helping a
physician choose a covering physician 12 or specialist. Alternatively, the
quality of care a specialist or consulting physician provides reflects upon the
primary physician's judgment, affects the care her patient receives, has an
impact on her work load, and can influence the patient's desire to remain with
the referring physician or clinic. Finally, reputation acts as an ex ante
indicator of the covering physician's standards, skills, demeanor, practice
skills, and medical philosophy. As such, it suggests to the referring physician
the confidence she should have in the consultant's advice, information,
second opinion, or services.
11. Formally, the physician services have many of the characteristics of what Satterthwaite
defines as a reputation good:
Each seller's product is differentiated from every other seller's product.
Product quality is consumer-specific, that is, one perfectly informed consumer may
prefer seller i's product over sellerj's product, while a second perfectly informed consumer
may prefer seller j's product over seller i's. This results from the fact that different
consumers value each seller's product's attributes differently, rather than the fact that
different consumers perceive the attributes of a seller's product differently.
The attributes of each seller's product can only be fully evaluated by experience with the
product over a significant length of time.
The product is important to consumers; each consumer is willing to expend significant
effort to find a seller offering a product that is, according to his particular preferences, of
high quality and reasonable price.
Satterthwaite, Consumer Information, Equilibrium Industry Price, and the Number of Sellers, 10 BELLJ. ECON.
483, 485-86 (1979).
12. The term "covering physician" refers to a doctor who would cover the calls of a colleague
on a regular basis-for example, every Tuesday night or every third weekend.
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Similarly, the reputation of a referring physician influences the consultant.
The consulting physician needs to know that the referred patient has had an
adequate medical examination. Without this assurance, the consulting
physician may be compelled to order a second examination or a second set of
tests. Besides the obvious monetary costs involved in duplication, a
reputation for unnecessarily redoing initial examinations can lead to
disruptive disagreements between physicians as well as to fewer referrals.
Finally, physicians also make human capital investments in developing a
relationship with their patients. On the one hand, the doctor-patient
relationship helps to perpetuate a physician's reputation. On the other hand,
this relationship helps a physician in treating the patient. In order to
understand, diagnose, and treat a patient's health problems, a physician
requires the patient's help and cooperation. The process of developing such
cooperation begins with the taking and digesting of the patient's medical
history. The physician invests not only in taking the history, but in recording
it in a manner understandable to herself and to other practitioners. Patients
provide information to doctors imprecisely and in code. The doctor, to be
effective, must discover how to interpret that code. Similarly, the physician
must learn whether she can rely on the patient's information. For instance,
how likely is it that the patient actually has the problem about which he is
complaining? A physician also needs to determinejust how much information
about diagnoses, prognoses, and techniques the patient needs, understands,
and can psychologically absorb.
Finally, whether a patient continues on a
prescribed regimen of medication, diet, exercise, or the like depends in part
13
on the degree to which she trusts the doctor's diagnosis and judgment.
As with any capital asset, the value of human capital is subject to risk. Risk,
meaning the likelihood that an actual outcome will vary from an expected
one, 14 can be conveniently divided into two types: systematic and
unsystematic. Systematic risk refers to the risk associated with holding any
asset, and is determined by those events that have a universal impact on
investments. Events with this impact can include general economic
adjustments, changes in regulatory policies, foreign affairs initiatives, or
domestic political activity. Unsystematic risk is the risk associated with
holding a given asset; that is, it refers to changes that affect only particular
assets.
Physicians face at least five types of unsystematic risk. First, they risk
having patients' tastes or demands for medical services change in unexpected
ways. For example, a sudden fitness craze might lead patients to increase
13. As David Mechanic observed,
The effectiveness of medical care depends on the patient's cooperation. The patient must
be able and willing to provide information, to conform with medical advice, to return to the
physician, to take medication properly, and to carry out numerous other tasks. Failures in
communication and empathy not only harm a vital function of medical care, but diminish
the opportunities for technical quality and effectiveness.

D. MECHANIC, THE GROWTH OF BUREAUCRATIC MEDICINE 11 (1976).
14.

J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 31 (7th ed. 1986).
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their visits to orthopedists dramatically and reduce their need for
cardiologists. Second, physicians risk the obsolescence of familiar technology
or their particular skills. For instance, the development of a new and safer
technique for surgically correcting scoleosis will only affect those physicians
who have investments in the now obsolete techniques for treating the disease.
Third, there is risk in the fact that changes in regulatory or reimbursement
policy will affect some specialists differently than others. For example, an
employer might announce that it will no longer pay for health insurance that
covers psychiatric examinations. Alternatively, changes in government
policies for reimbursement of medical costs may make it more lucrative to
treat a particular disease with surgery than with medication, placing greater
demands on surgeons and fewer on internists. Fourth, doctors risk having an
unexpectedly large number of new physicians enter their area of expertise and
specialization. This can adversely affect a physician's market position and,
therefore, her income. Finally, physicians risk that their specialty will become
subject to unexpected changes in liability. A common practice among a class
of specialists might later be shown to be unreasonable or defective. Or, given
the vagaries of juries, certain specialties might become vulnerable to
unexpectedly high malpractice awards, especially for pain and suffering.
Portfolio theory suggests that risk-averse investors will attempt to
structure their investments so as to lower their overall risk without reducing
the return they receive. 15 To do so the parties will choose investments with
desirable risk/return characteristics. 16 But in choosing their investments they
must remain cognizant of the fact that markets only compensate parties for
unavoidable risk. That is, markets pay no premium for assuming risks that
could be eliminated at no reduction in return. Since unsystematic risk is the
risk one takes that a particular event will affect the value of only certain assets,
markets assume that the parties can eliminate this type of risk by investing in
assets with a countervailing reaction to the particular event. In other words,
markets will not compensate for unsystematic risk, because risks of this type
7
can be eliminated through diversification.'
Where investments are in assets such as common stock or bonds,
eliminating unsystematic risk can be achieved by buying shares in companies
with countervailing characteristics. Where the primary investment is in
human capital, however, as is the case with physicians, the problem is more
complicated. A physician only receives a return on her investment if she is
actually working. She cannot, for instance, buy shares in numerous different
types of medical practices or sell shares in her own practice. Institutional
15. For a more detailed discussion of portfolio theory, see R. BREALEY & S. MEYERS, PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE FINANCE 117-63 (198 1);J. VAN HORNE, supra note 14, at 55-95; see generally W. SHARPE,
(1970).
16. For any given level of risk, a risk-averse investor will prefer more return over less. Similarly,
for any given level of return, that investor will prefer less risk to more.
17. See, e.g., R. BREALEY & S. MEYERS, supra note 15, at 123-26;J. VAN HORNE, supra note 14, at
67-72; Modigliani & Pogue, An Introduction to Risk and Return: Concepts and Evidence, FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
Mar.-Apr. 1974, at 68, 73-76.
PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS
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constraints, such as codes of ethics, state regulations, and monitoring
problems, prevent her from doing so. In addition, she cannot usually diversify
her risks by becoming proficient in numerous countervailing specialties, such
as pediatrics and geriatrics. Technical constraints generally prevent her from
specializing in more than one or two fields, and the modern trend in medicine
is toward greater specialization, as opposed to diversification, of skills.
III
DIVERSIFICATION THROUGH POOLING

While a physician cannot diversify her investments by purchasing shares in
other practices, a group of physicians could pool and share the return on their
respective investments in different medical specialties. That is, the physicians
could enter into an agreement to affiliate their practices, contribute all their
earnings to a common pool, and later distribute that income to the various
participants. Taken alone, each physician would be subject to the
unsystematic risk endemic to her specialty. By pooling the return associated
with various specialties, however, the physicians would effectively create a
mutual fund of financially complementary physician assets. Assuming
proportional representation from the entire spectrum of basic medical
specialties, the fund would represent a diversified portfolio of physician
investments in human capital. The physicians could then divide up the fund
among themselves on the basis of a predetermined sharing rule. Each
physician would receive not only part of the return on her own investment,
but a percentage of the return on the other physicians' investments as well.
In theory it should be possible to devise a pooling arrangement that allows
the physician to diversify her risk effectively by sharing in the returns of her
colleagues' investments in human capital. To effectuate the arrangement at
least two terms must be specified. First, the parties require a method of
dividing the pooled funds that will pass on to individual physicians the riskdiversification advantages of the pool. Second, because devising a
compensation scheme is difficult, the physicians will require a specialized
governance structure to enforce the underlying agreement.
Conventional economic theory, which is devoid of transaction cost
considerations, would suggest that the compensation formula should reflect
the marginal contribution of each physician;' 8 that is, each physician should
"eat what she kills."' 9 A rule that emphasizes marginal productivity, however,
will suffer from two problems. First, measuring marginal product in an
imperfect world is complicated and imprecise. Consequently, the formulas
that are used are only approximate reflections of actual productivity. The
divergence between actual and approximated productivity can give rise to
many of the incentive compatibility problems discussed below. In addition,
each party is likely to work to maximize her own benefits under the formula.
18.
19.

Pauly, Efficiency, Incentives, and Reimbursementfor Health Care, 7 INQUIRY 114 (1970).
One can only hope that no physician takes this prescription literally.
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If the formula does not reflect actual productivity, then individual
maximization will not lead to firm (social) maximization.
Second, if a physician's share of the mutual fund is based on a
productivity-based index, such as the income she herself generates or the
number of patients she sees, she would be subject to the same unsystematic
risk she would have faced in solo practice. If something unexpectedly caused
her to lose patients, her income would drop accordingly. To diversify risk
effectively, a physician must share in her colleagues' productivity, and they
must share in hers. Marginal productivity-sharing rules will compensate her
only for her own productivity. Effective risk sharing requires the parties to
distribute the pooled income on the basis of some productivity-neutral index
such as age, seniority, years out of school, or perfect equality.
While a compensation scheme of this nature permits effective risk
diversification, it can also lead to severe ex post incentive compatability
problems. In particular, these problems include those that can arise when
one or more parties to a contract decides that the agreement negotiated
earlier no longer comports with their own best interests. Problems of this
nature arise in all contracting. At the time of the initial bargain the future is
uncertain. As events unfold and additional information comes to light, the
parties can determine whether the original bargain can be improved. For
example, in the risk-diversification context the parties initially agreed to share
their productive years with a group of colleagues in exchange for a share of
the others' productivity. The objective was to reduce the variance associated
with their future stream of earnings. If, from the outset, a physician knew with
absolute certainty that her practice would remain fully profitable throughout
her lifetime she would have no risk-diversification incentive to enter into the
sharing arrangement. Similarly, as the future unfolds, a physician can
discover just how productive she has been and whose skills are unneeded or
problematic. As the future becomes known, initial bargains can begin to look
less advantageous, and one party can become dissatisfied with the agreement
as she discovers that she was compensated at a level below the value of her
full marginal product. At this juncture, parties have an incentive to act
20
opportunistically.
In the physician contracting context, opportunism takes one of three
forms. 2

First, opportunism can refer to the failure to produce the promised

quantity or quality of medical care. Implementation of the risk-sharing
agreement requires each physician to promise to produce at least as much as
she would in the absence of a sharing arrangement. Distribution of the
mutual fund, however, depends upon something other than the physician's
marginal productivity. Consequently, she will have an incentive to act
20.

0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 6, at 79-83.
21. In describing the various types of opportunism, I have borrowed a set of classifications used
by Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 10, at 330-39. Although my earlier work on physician opportunism,
see Palay, supra note 3, captures many of the same ideas expressed by Gilson and Mnookin's labels, I
have a strong interest in standardizing transaction cost jargon. In addition, these two authors'
further decomposition of opportunism provides potentially interesting analytic insights.
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opportunistically by shirking-producing less than she would if she retained
the entire product of her efforts.
Second, once the future has been revealed, the parties can act
opportunistically by demanding a larger share of the risk pool than they
originally agreed to. When the parties establish a formula for sharing the
returns on their respective investments, no one knows what the future holds.
That is, after all, the principal impetus for a risk-sharing agreement. Later,
the world is revealed, and at least some of the physicians are likely to find that
their share of the compensation pool is less than their marginal product.
These physicians will have an incentive to attempt to grab more income than
they originally agreed to accept. Physicians in high-income specialties such as
surgery or radiology often come to believe that they are subsidizing the
primary care provider members of the group. This often leads to attempts to
renegotiate the compensation formula.
Third, as the future unfolds and actual productivity becomes known, a
physician who felt she was receiving less than her productivity warranted
could also exit. That is, she could act opportunistically by leaving or
threatening to leave, taking her skills, her patients, and other physicians'
patients with her.
IV
INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES

To diversify risks, the physicians require an institutional arrangement that
effectively eliminates the incentives to shirk, grab, or leave. In other words,
the physicians must create or find some mechanism-a governance
structure-to monitor behavior, adapt the contract to changed circumstances,
and ensure that agreed upon exchanges are actually performed. They
presumably want the least costly arrangement possible. The specific nature of
the physicians' contracting problems, however, limits the available
institutional alternatives.
Under traditional economic analysis one option might be to imbed the
entire governance structure in the initial contract. For example, the
physicians might try to address and resolve all potential problems at the
outset and devise an efficient contract. Many of the conditions that place
physician capital at risk, however, also make self-enforcing contracts costly or
impossible. For instance, the existence of complexity and uncertainty
eliminates the possibility of comprehensive planning or once-and-for-all
contracting for all contingencies. 22 Complexity and uncertainty make it
difficult, if not impossible, to contract for every possible contingency,
response, or probability associated with a given situation.
Adaptive sequential contracting-learning by doing-and market
guarantees both provide obvious alternatives. However, adaptive sequential
22.

Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-In General and with Respect to CATV, 7

BELLJ. ECON.

73, 79 (1976).
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contracting requires that the parties be able to rely upon their partners'
promises to act in good faith during any renegotiation.2 3 Protecting oneself
during renegotiation is not difficult where market substitutes are readily
available. If markets actually exist, then a surgeon who becomes dissatisfied
with the risk-sharing agreement would be able to leave the group and start her
own practice or join another clinic. Similarly, the partnership could simply
replace the surgeon with another physician who had made similar investments
in human capital.
However, there are both structural and institutional limits on the
fungibility of the physician's human capital. 24 First, investments in training
and specialization are not easily altered. A psychiatrist who enters a particular
risk-diversification pool will be unlikely to become a surgeon without great
cost. Similarly, the pools' training of physicians in the philosophy, practice
patterns, and procedures of the group are not alterable without cost. Second,
the reputation that made a physician attractive to a particular pool may also
limit the physician's future alternatives. A particular reputation may make the
doctor attractive to only a limited number of pools. The extent to which the
initial choice of pools molds one's reputation, practice patterns, and medical
philosophy further limits future alternatives. Once other physicians become
aware of the attributes represented by a reputation, a physician who wishes to
change her reputation will need to expend considerable resources to develop
and communicate those changes. Third, a physician's investment in her
relationships with her patients are not transferrable. She will be unable to use
her familiarity with Patient A's personal traits to treat Patient B. To the extent
that specific patients cannot follow a physician who leaves, those investments
are lost. This risk is most applicable to primary care physicians, such as
internists or pediatricians, who make more substantial investments in patients
than do specialists, such as surgeons or radiologists. Finally, institutional
constraints, such as agreements not to compete, are common in the contracts
between affiliated physicans 25 and limit the redeployablity of physician assets.
Similarly, medical plans that tie patients to practices, not doctors, make it
difficult for a physician to leave a practice without great cost. If she were to
leave without her patients, then any investment in doctor-patient relations
would be lost.
Where the parties must make non-redeployable investments to effectuate
their contract obligations, any markets that might have existed during the
initial bargaining will disappear once the agreement is set. 2 6 Instead, the
parties will find themselves, ex post, in a small-numbers bargaining situation
where they become subject to opportunistic conduct. Under these
circumstances, standard market solutions, such as dissolving the partnership
23.
24.

Williamson, supra note 22, at 79-90.
Palay, supra note 3, at 935-37.

25. Getty, Enforceability of Noncompetition Covenants in Physician Employment Contracts: Confusion in the
Courts, 7J. LEGAL MED. 235, 235-39 (1986).
26. 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 6, at 28-30.
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and redeploying the assets, or other general purpose governance schemes,
put the investments in non-redeployable assets at severe risk. Dissolving the
partnership agreement places the physician in the same position she would
have been in had she never attempted to enter a pooling arrangement and the
feared state of nature had actually occurred. But the inability to dissolve the
agreement places her in an inferior bargaining position ex post and subjects
her to opportunistic conduct. Markets will not protect her. Thus the
physician will be unwilling to enter into the pooling arrangement unless some
method can be found to protect her investment in human capital adequately.
For adequate protection of their investments in idiosyncratic capital and
for provision of the requisite incentives for completing the agreements, the
parties require a governance structure that will foster cooperative and
adaptive behavior.
A.

Institutional Responses to Grabbing and Leaving: Of Knights and
Kings and Hostage-Taking

Sometimes the old ways are the most reliable. Remember how the wicked
king would promise the good knight his freedom if the knight would perform
some specified service? And remember how the king would take the knight's
young child or trusted servant hostage to ensure that the knight did not
simply disappear? A modern counterpart to the king's taking of hostages can
insure against the problems of grabbing or leaving. A mutual hostage-taking
will assure all bargainers that there are real losses associated with
opportunistic conduct.
Rather than the leaving of one's youngest child with one's contracting
partners, the Physician-hostage exchange takes a more subtle form. The
organizational equivalent of the hostage is investment in assets that either
cannot be easily removed from the firm or will be destroyed if the partnership
breaks up. The rationale is relatively simple. One's incentive to grab or leave
is based upon a perceived divergence between the ex ante compensation
formula and ex post marginal product. But a physician's incentive to leave
depends upon her ability actually to receive this marginal product elsewhere.
If the parties can devise a method by which one's marginal product will always
be greater within the firm than elsewhere, they effectively will keep a physician
from grabbing or leaving. Firm-specific capital 2 7 provides the requisite
hostage mechanism. A partner's ability to grab more income for herself is
ultimately dependent upon the viability of her threat to leave if she does not
get what she wants within the firm. The more dependent a partner's marginal
product is on firm-specific assets, the less viable is her threat to grab or leave.
In the physician context, firm-specific capital can take several forms. First,
it can be found in a stable patient base that is tied to the partnership and not
27. Gilson and Mnookin define firm-specific capital as "the capitalized value of the difference
between a firm's earnings as an ongoing institution and the combined value of the human capital of
its individual partners, if this human capital were deployed outside the firm in its next most
productive use." Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 10, at 354.
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to individual physicians. Employer health benefits that provide 100 percent of
the premium of only the lowest cost health insurance plan, health plans that
require minimum enrollment periods or long waiting periods prior to full
coverage, and excellent associated physicians, facilities, or other benefits can
all lock patients into plans, not particular primary care physicians.
In addition to its role in the hostage exchange, the stable patient base is
also a desirable asset because of its enhancement of marginal productivity and
its promotion of efficient task-structuring through the provision of a
predictable and consistent flow of work. 28 With a stable patient base,
schedules can be coordinated, staffing can be rationalized, and specialists
need not worry about their sources for patients. A stable patient base also
permits the physician to fully amortize the fixed, up-front costs associated
with developing a doctor-patient relationship. These costs include gathering
information about the patient's medical record, understanding the imprecise
code in which the patient provides information, and developing a trust
relationship with the patient.
A second form of firm-specific capital can be found in the reputation of the
physician group as a whole. The firm reputation provides patients with a
reliable indicator of the quality of covering or consulting physicians. It is
costly and difficult before choosing a physician, and often even afterwards, for
a patient to seek information about the quality of care offered by his own
physician. An important source of quality-of-care information is the
reputation of the physician's practice which, then, also becomes a mechanism
for quality assurance. When a physician leaves a practice, she loses the
advantages of her association with that reputation. More significantly, she
risks the potential stigma that she left because she could not meet the
standards demanded by the group.
Finally, a third form of firm-specific capital can be found in the quality of
the patient base. Precisely who uses a particular group of physicians, and how
sophisticated the users are as consumers of medical care, can be important
signals to potential patients of the quality of the practice. If the patient base is
relatively stable, then a doctor who attempts to grab or leave will be unable to
take her investments with her.
B.

Attenuating Shirking: Social Control

To implement the diversification agreement, the parties also require a
governance structure that weakens the incentive to shirk. To be effective the
governance structure must deal with two problems. First, the structure must
be sufficiently discriminating to distinguish between legitimate and
illegitimate reductions in work effort. The purpose of the diversification
agreement is to protect the physician from events beyond her control that
affect her special set of skills and that prevent her from realizing the full
28.

(1980).

Id.; see also F.

SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

89-91
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return on her investment in human capital. The intent of the contract would
be nullified if the governance structure sanctioned a physician for reductions
in productivity caused by the presence of a risk she hoped to mitigate through
diversification. Thus the problem is to develop a method of accurately
screening reduced work efforts. For example, to support the diversification
agreement, the governance structure must accurately distinguish between the
drop in an obstetrician's productivity attributable to unexpectedly low birth
rates and that due to shirking.
Though the need to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate productivity
reductions complicates the traditional monitoring problem, the solution is
reasonably straightforward. The solution involves comparing individual
29
physician work effort to that of other members of the same specialty cohort.
For example, obstetricians would be compared to other obstetricians and
internists to other internists. If the work level of an individual was reduced
below the minimum acceptable level of his cohort, the assumption would be
that he was shirking. But if the entire cohort showed a reduction, it would be
safer to assume that one of the risks that led to the diversification agreement
in the first place-lower birth rates, for example-had come to pass.
But any monitoring scheme is only as good as its ability to measure
performance accurately, and this limitation raises the second problem:
devising a governance structure sophisticated enough to encourage not only a
quantity of work, but a quality of effort as well. The problem medicine, and
for that matter any profession, faces is finding a summary statistic that
accurately reflects both quantity and quality of performance. First, there is
the problem of measuring the amount of work effort. Measuring work effort
raises questions about evaluation criteria: whether the physicians should use
hours seeing patients, number of hours spent in the office, number of patients
seen, gross income generated, net income generated, or any number of other
measurements. There is also the problem that whatever measure of work
effort is used, it is only an approximation for what it is the physicians want to
measure-the level of quality and effective medical service offered. In short,
monitoring actual activity provides only part of the answer to preventing
shirking.
The full solution to the shirking problem involves instilling the group with
a common "work ethic" 30 by combining prospective monitoring with a
complex system of social control. 3 ' Prospective monitoring is the careful
29. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 10, at 373-75.
30. Gilson and Mnookin refer to this process as the development of a firm culture. Id. at 375.
My notion is quite similar, though I differ in my understanding of the mechanics of the process.
Consequently, I refer to it by what I consider to be a more descriptive name.
31. The motivation to do good work comes, in the first instance, from one or more of three
sources. First, the physician's personality, training, and past interactions with role models may
provide the primary motivating force. Second, the physician may strive to meet certain standards
because of a concern that her peers may disapprove or no longer respect her. Finally, the physician
can take her primary motivation from material self-interest. E. FREIDSON, DOCTORING TOGETHER: A
STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL CONTROL 188-89 (1975). Where the motivation comes from is

irrelevant, so long as the normative standard it produces comports with those agreed to at the outset.
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selection of contracting partners to reduce the need to monitor actual
contract performance. 3 2 The idea is to find a group of doctors who have a
reasonably homogeneous set of characteristics and motivations, which
reduces the need for explicit monitoring in the future. These characteristics
will have been developed in complex ways through family life, schooling,
training, and past employment. It is impossible to specify the qualities for
which a particular group should look. Because shirking is a relative concept,
dependent upon the definition of the expected norm, the key to successful
prospective monitoring is locating like-minded individuals who agree ex ante
on the definition of acceptable behavior.
Prospective monitoring, by reducing the probability of conflicting norms
existing within the group, provides only a starting point for development of
an effective group work ethic. If ex post observations always confirmed ex
ante representations and impressions, governance structure would be
unnecessary. Because during contract execution the world often looks
different than the parties originally imagined, a complex system of social
control is also required.
Social control refers to "those processes in the social system which tend to
counteract the deviant tendencies." 3 3 Within a medical practice, social
control requires more than simple economic incentives.3 4 Social control can
be derived from either formal or informal elements. The formal aspects of
social control are manifested in administrative rules and a hierarchical
authority structure. Ostensibly, minimum levels of productivity could be
established by administrative rule. For example, an administration could
establish a minimum number of hours that the physician would have to be in
her office, seeing patients or doing paperwork, and the type of verification she
must provide. Rules could also be established to specify the elements of good
practice under specified conditions-for example, a physician who sees a
twenty-eight-year-old male patient who is complaining of a rash and fever
should perform a particular examination and order a prespecified battery of
laboratory tests. Formal sanctions-running from administrative reprimand,
to financial penalties, to dismissal-could be used to penalize doctors who
offend the administrative standards.
Formal authority can also involve elements of a "hierarchy of titles and
offices," 3 5 with lower units subordinate to the upper levels of administration.
For example, medical groups often have a hierarchically organized central
administration run by of an administrator and a medical director in charge of
specified areas of the practice. Below them will usually be an executive
committee, the specialty group heads, and the remaining physicians. In
theory, each upper unit has the authority to implement by fiat a policy that
affects members of subordinate units.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Palay, supra note 3, at 945-46.
T. PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 297 (1951).
Palay, supra note 3, at 938-47.
E. FREIDSON, supra note 31, at 105.
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The motivation to do good work can also come from informal elements of
social control. Informal controls are more likely where either the holders of
authority are, for some reason, reluctant to exercise their powers or the
6
associated practitioners are unwilling to grant the titular bosses legitimacy.3
As with formal methods of social control, the informal process requires the
development, monitoring, and enforcement of normative standards. Unlike
the more formal structures, though, informal means of social control are
rarely promulgated, codified, or officially administered. Informal social
control requires each physician to compare her colleagues' actions to the set
of norms specified at the outset.
The evaluation of her colleagues' work will be guided by the physician's
assumptions about herself and her preconceptions about physicians in
general. Most physicians believe that they and their associates are mature,
ethical, conscientious, competent, and highly individualistic. 3 7 They believe,
therefore, that other physicians will be self-motivated to achieve excellence
and unlikely to change. Thus, before a physician will sanction another
physician, even informally, she is likely to require a variety of different types
of compelling information.
Unlike the system of formal methods, the requisite information for
informal control is not likely to be gathered in a systematic manner. Instead,
the information is likely to be compiled sporadically and impressionistically.
As a first step, most physicians will evaluate a colleague by looking at her
formal credentials; that is, her education, post-medical school training, and
her board certifications. 3 8 Next, a physician will evaluate her colleague's
productivity from the information she picks up from patients they have in
common. 39 Information also comes from what other physicians say about a
particular doctor. 40 Though this source amounts to little more than lunch
room and hallway gossip, it provides an important source of corroborative
evidence. A fourth type of evaluative information can come from shared
patient charts and medical records. These can tell an interested physician
something about her colleague's work habits, productivity, and quality of
care. 4 1 The final, and perhaps most important, source of data comes from a
physician's own experiences and relationship with the other doctor. 4 2 This
last category of information can be generated from either formal
45
44
consultations, 4 3 informal consultations, or casual shoptalk.
When information causes a physician to believe that her colleague is
shirking, she has the option of sanctioning that behavior in one of two ways.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

105-19.
121-24.
139-41.
141-42.
142-45.
167-85.
145-49.
151-54.
154-57.
157-60.
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On the one hand, she can withdraw favors in areas in which cooperation is
optional. 4 6 She can, for instance, refuse to look in on the shirking colleague's
patient or, alternatively, she could stop asking him to consult on particularly
interesting cases. 4 7 On the other hand, a physician has the option of openly
complaining about the behavior of her colleague. 4 8 Criticisms of this nature
can be made openly either to the offending physician, to other physicians, or
to a review committee.
V
ORGANIZATIONAL ALTERNATIVES

To this point, this article has argued that a group of physicians willing to
share their productivity can diversify the risks associated with their
investments in human capital. Doing so ultimately requires the development
of a governance structure that attenuates problems of shirking or grabbing
and leaving. However, the organizational forms that will produce the
requisite governance arrangement have not yet been discussed. The purpose
of this section is to argue that either internal organization or relational
contracting will suffice.
In the context of other professions, some have argued that devising the
requisite governance structure requires the development of internal
organization, that is, a firm. 49 They have argued that without the structure of

a firm, the relationships between the parties will be too unstable to support
the efficient development of firm-specific capital, enforceable norms, and peer
interaction. For physicians, this argument implies that diversification requires
the formation of a group practice. A group practice entails the merging of
physicians financially, administratively, and physically into one vertically and
horizontally integrated firm; in most instances, the doctors share a single
building, support staff, laboratory, and diagnostic service.
Clearly, the group practice provides a mechanism for pooling. A desire to
diversify risks might in fact explain the growing popularity and prevalence of
salary-based compensation 5° in group practices. To the extent that
compensation is productivity-neutral, there exist the rudiments of a
diversification agreement. Freidson's vivid description of group practice
makes it clear that the physicians have the capability of developing the social
control necessary to mitigate the inclination to shirk. 5 1 Firm reputation, as
46. Id. at 206-09.
47. Id. at 208.
48. Id. at 209-10.
49. Gilson and Mnookin suggest that contracting will prove inadequate as a mechanism for
sharing human capital. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 10, at 338-39. But this view ignores both the
role of relational contracting, see Palay, supra note 3, at 938-47, and the ability of contracts to
incorporate elements of hierarchy, see A. STINCHCOMBE & C. HEIMER, ORGANIZATION THEORY AND
PROJECT MANAGEMENT: ADMINISTERING UNCERTAINTY IN NORWEGIAN OFFSHORE OIL 155-66 (1985).
50. Of course, compensation by salary per se is not an indication of risk diversification. If salary
is based upon a formula that accounts for productivity or if a significant percentage of total
compensation is based upon a productivity bonus, the risk-diversification goals will be lost.
51. See supra Part IV. B.

Page 161: Winter 1989]

DIVERSIFYING PHYSICIAN RISK THROUGH CONTRACT

177

opposed to individual reputation, can provide some, but not all, of the
requisite hostages necessary to stem grabbing and leaving. If the physicians
want to attenuate opportunistic behavior, they need to find some technique
for tying patients to the group rather than to individual doctors. The solution
is simple enough if benefit plans are written to hinder patient mobility. One
possibility, in the context of an HMO, is for the contract with the patient to
require a minimum enrollment period. Alternatively, the employer might be
encouraged to enter into a medical services contract with only a single
provider. Finally, where an employer offers more than one health plan,
employees might be permitted to switch either only during prespecified open
enrollment periods or with long waiting periods for full coverage.
However, the assumption that only a group practice, or a firm, can provide
the requisite governance structure to support a risk-diversification agreement
ignores twenty years of relational contract theory. 52 Relational contract
theory views contracting as a process of continuous interaction, not as a
discrete event with fixed terms and contingencies. I have argued elsewhere
that relational contracting and quasi-integration can achieve many of the same
diversification benefits of a firm. 5 3 Properly conceived clinics without walls
and individual practice associations could provide convenient vehicles for
diversifying risk without resort to internal organization.
The individual practice association ("IPA") is a particularly appropriate
vehicle for risk diversification. An IPA is an administrative entity to which
independently affiliated physicians with geographically dispersed practices
have agreed to provide services. The IPA then sells the collective product of
the doctors to an HMO. 54 Thus, the IPA is a set of contracts between
unaffiliated physicians who want to integrate some proportion of their total
product without physically merging their various practices into a centralized
firm.
The physicians are likely to find that in order for the IPA to succeed,
irrespective of the basis for compensation and the desire for risk
diversification, they must develop a governance structure similar to that
required to support a productivity-neutral sharing rule. In particular, the
governance arrangements used to handle the wide range of potential
contracting problems faced by an IPA must be internally derived and created
55
by the parties themselves for the particular set of transactions at hand.
52. See generally Macaulay, supra note 2; Macneil, supra note 2; Palay, supra note 3; Symposium,
Law, Private Governance, and Continuing Relationships, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 461-757.
53. Palay, Organizing,supra note 8. The remainder of this section is based on this earlier article.
54. Id. at 730.
55. Ironically, what I term a "proper" governance structure requires that the participating
physicians give up at least some of the autonomy that they anticipated retaining. The result is that a
well-functioning IPA will differ from the group practice more in degree than in kind. Admittedly the
IPA and the group differ in their governance arrangements. The former tends to be more formalistic
and rule-oriented. In the IPA, communication and information exchanges tend to involve both
formal settings (meetings) and channels (memos). The group practice is able to take advantage of
the close proximity of the physicians to foster a strong social structure and communications network.
Interaction can be more informal in such an environment and norms are more likely to be
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The argument set forth in this article stems from an analysis of the
contracting underlying the formation of an IPA. 5 6 In short, the problems the
physicians face in organizing an IPA are similar to those they must overcome
in devising a risk-sharing agreement. The source of these problems is the
physician's need to protect her investment in human capital. 5 7 Standard
financially based incentives and market solutions-that is, dissolving the
partnership and redeploying the assets-put physician investments in nonredeployable assets at severe risk. The doctors are likely to resist using thirdparty governance schemes, such as courts or arbitration, to enforce their
contracts and protect their investments in transaction-specific capital because
arrangements of this nature are expensive and tend to produce outcomes that
58
are beyond the control of the parties.
Because of these contracting problems the parties organizing an IPA will
require a governance structure that is internal 5 9 -that is, customized by the
established by example rather than by fiat. However, despite the emphasis on informal interaction,
the evidence indicates that the group practice is the more likely of the two to be hierarchical and
subject to a powerful medical director. But the differences witnessed between the IPA and the group
tend to be more in degree than in kind. The differences are a product of the variations in the
communications and social structure developed by the two organizations. Despite these differences,
both types of HMO's maintain fundamental control over their governance arrangements. Both
organizational forms can develop their own governance structure; internal control is the primary
determinant of whether a governance structure is transaction-specific.
Consequently, it is possible to develop an internalized governance structure even if the parties
choose not to organize themselves as a firm. Parties that are more loosely associated, as in an IPA,
can effectively develop the necessary governance mechanism, but only if they are prepared to
become "quasi-integrated."
Quasi-vertical integration refers to a situation where independent parties, associated by contract,
develop a relationship that is so close that, at least with respect to a particular transaction, they
approximate vertically integrated firms. See, e.g., Blois, Vertical Quasi-Integration, 20 J. INDUS. ECON.
253 (1972); Blois, Supply Contracts in the Galbraithian Planning System, 24 J. INDUS. ECON. 29 (1975);
Kessler & Stern, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1 (1959); Klein, Crawford &
Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & EcoN.
297 (1978).
56. Palay, Organizing, supra note 8, at 738-41.
57. The existence of uncertainty and complexity makes impossible both comprehensive
planning and once-and-for-all contracting. Adaptive sequential contracting provides an alternative.
However, renegotiating the contract requires that the parties act in good faith at the contract renewal
phase or that markets guarantee the recontracting. Unfortunately, physicians, like everyone else, can
act opportunistically, and the investments in transaction-specific human capital drastically reduce the
availability of substitutes during renegotiation.
58. Macaulay found that "as one businessman put it, 'You can settle any dispute if you keep the
lawyers and accountants out of it. They just do not understand the give-and-take needed in
business.' " Macaulay, supra note 2, at 61.
59. This is not to say that a governance structure must be internally generated to be transactionspecific. One could imagine an external agency of some sort that specialized in enforcing only a
certain class of transactions. Williamson offers the infrequency of interaction as one explanation for
why parties to transactions involving idiosyncratic capital might want specialized, external agencies
to develop. Williamson, supra note 8. Regulatory agencies like the Federal Communications
Commission or the Interstate Commerce Commission might be classified as specialized. However,
because a large number of different transactions must be handled by an agency of this sort, they are
relatively less transaction-specific than governance structures that are derived by the parties
themselves. In fact, parties to transactions involving idiosyncratic investments can find that even
specialized agencies are inadequate and may look for means to avoid their auspices. Palay, Avoiding
Regulatory Constraints: Contracting Safeguards and the Role of Informal Agreements, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORGAN.
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parties-to the transaction. 60 As with the system of social control required to
permit diversification, the primary purpose of the IPA governance
arrangement will be to foster cooperative and adaptive behavior.
Internal organization, vertical integration, and hierarchy, which are
characteristics of the group practice, are all typical examples of specialized
governance structures. 6 1 Properly conceived, the governance structure of the
IPA can achieve similar results. Where the group practice relies upon the
geographic proximity of the participating physicians to foster social cohesion,
a team-orientation, informal interaction, interdependence, and hierarchy, the
IPA must find specialized governance through "quasi-integration." Quasiintegration is characterized by a contractual relationship where nominally
independent parties are so closely related that they approximate a vertically
62
integrated enterprise.

Geographic dispersion, infrequent physician contact,

and a strong

countervailing desire by the physician to maintain autonomy result in a less
cohesive and homogeneous underlying social structure in the IPA than in the

group practice. Therefore, the parties in an IPA will need to develop and
monitor a penalty-and-reward structure that emphasizes the more formal
mechanisms of social control: formalized peer interactions and expressed
norms. 6 3 The former will include joint decisionmaking, consultation,
meetings, review activities, and overall reinforcement and scrutiny that
constitutes the environment within which the physician works. 64 Thus, where
the peer interaction in the group practice can be carried out in the halls and
while sharing charts, 65 the IPA requires relatively regularized and scheduled
meetings, peer-review proceedings, and administrative procedures.
155 (1985). Therefore, the existence of an internally generated governance structure indicates
transaction-specificity. The reverse need not be true.
60. Not only does this indicate the degree to which the transaction remains autonomous from
outside governance, but internally generated incentive systems are also not easily transferred to
other parties or exchanges. Thus, they are indicative of a transaction-specific governance structure.
61. 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 5, at 78, 85-102.
62. See supra note 55.
63. As Meier and Tillotson concluded:
As is true with preadmission certification, formal concurrent review programs are likely to
be more effective in an IPA setting, where practice patterns vary widely among physicians
and the physician/HMO interaction may be less frequent. Concurrent review can occur
informally in group practice settings, where physicians commonly discuss hospital cases; a
formal concurrent review may add little. The larger and less interactive the group becomes,
the more effective a formal program may be. Of the five HMOs employing concurrent
review, Health Maintenance Plan/Cincinnati was the only group practice; here the review
portion was viewed as a program of major importance.
Meier & Tillotson, Physician Reimbursement and Hospital Use in HMOs 58 (Sept. 1978)
(unpublished monograph).
64. Id. at 73, 75, app. B.
65. In the group practice, peer interaction is much more informal than that required by the IPA.
Interactions can occur naturally in the course of watching what others do, through contacts in the
hall, over lunch, through conversations in the doctors' lounge, or during similar unstructured
activities. Real resources are expended both in developing the trust relationships required by an
informal process and in the numerous small blocks of time used for consultations and other
meetings.
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Social control in an IPA will also need to emphasize the development of
administratively devised norms. For the most part these centrally created
rules and procedures are a means of communicating standards and
establishing benchmarks of behavior. The rules must be reinforced by
sanctions that can range in severity from gentle reminders to monetary
penalties, 6 6 or, in extreme cases, to termination.
To support a long-term contractual relationship effectively, the IPA
governance structure must produce information concerning the status of
transactions and the behavior of contracting parties. The data are required
both to promote planning and ensure compliance. To generate the requisite
information an IPA will need formalized, sophisticated, and technically
complex feedback systems. 6 7 Some monitoring can be achieved prospectively
by carefully choosing the physicians with whom one contracts, thereby
reducing the future need to do compliance monitoring. Historically group
practices have been more successful at screening and selecting physicians
than have IPA's. 6 8 Some IPA's, though, do have successful physician selection
programs. 6 9
If the organizers of an IPA choose to develop a governance structure of
this nature, they will find that they have already developed much of the
governance required to attenuate the shirking that is potentially associated
with a risk-sharing agreement. As with a group practice, the IPA can control
grabbing and leaving by making reputation and patients into firm-specific
assets. Thus the IPA has the opportunity to use the HMO as a mechanism to
diversify risk at little additional institutional cost. There is nothing wrong
with marginal productivity pricing if the parties are uninterested in risk
diversification. But if they are interested in diversifying their investment in
66. For example, the HMO could make the physician personally liable for a percentage of any
revenue shortfall suffered by the practice or for the costs incurred by the practice when the physician
recommends care that is later determined to be unnecessary or inappropriate.
67. The Franklin Area Health Plan ("FAHP")-a Maine-based IPA-provides an example of one
such system. First, a committee conducted an ex post review of the admissions practices and
ambulatory care patterns of the participating physicians. A series of HMO and individual physician
performance indicators were generated from the review. This information was both transmitted
directly to the doctors and used in internal enforcement proceedings. Meier & Tillotson, supra note
63, at B-7. Besides the formal retrospective review, FAHP also generated and processed informal
information on concurrent review. For instance, the medical director received a continuous flow of
updated data on current hospitalizations. He reviewed and discussed the cases with the admitting
physician in an effort to minimize unnecessary hospital days. Id. at B-6.
68. The latter have faced competing objectives: (1) containing costs by careful selection of
physicians, and (2) broadening the patient base by maximizing the number of participating
physicians. For marketing reasons they have tended to reconcile these objectives in favor of
increasing the number of physicians. Thus they tend to be less selective in choosing physicians and
are often forced by their organizers (especially when the local medical society is an organizer) to
accept any physician who applies. This constraint can mean having to hire physicians who are high
utilizers or are not cost effective.
69. For instance, in the New Mexico Health Care Corporation "all physicians are reviewed
annually for cost and quality of care in order to qualify them for reappointment as a partcipating
provider. In the past, some have been refused reappointment." Meier & Tillotson, supra note 63, at
55.
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human capital they can easily do so by basing at least part of their
compensation structure on a sharing rule.
To put the point a different way, it is possible to develop an internalized
governance stucture even if the parties choose not to organize themselves as a
firm. Parties that are more loosely associated-as in an IPA-can effectively
develop the necessary governance mechanism; however, this development is
possible only if they are prepared to become quasi-integrated. Of course, one
of the attributes of quasi-integration is the degree to which the contracting
parties give up their autonomy. They agree, more or less, to subordinate
their individual interests to the joint interests of the organization as a whole.
This effect on autonomy will certainly have an impact on a physician's HMO
practice patterns. In addition, to the extent that a physician is unprepared to
maintain two practice patterns-one for the HMO and one for her individual
patients-her non-HMO health care services will also be influenced. Thus,
physicans who want to participate in an HMO must be prepared to give up
some of the autonomy that they have traditionally cherished.

VI
CONCLUSION

This article has argued that a physician can use contract to diversify the
risks associated with her investments in human capital. By agreeing to
integrate her practice with physicians who possess complementary skills, a
physician can effectively eliminate much of the unsystematic risk she faces.
The physicians must agree to pool the income from their practices and then
distribute it among themselves on the basis of a productivity-neutral formula.
The terms of the contract are conceptually quite simple; any competent
attorney or experienced health care consultant could draft an agreement that
would achieve the goals set forth above. The key to a successful contract
resides not in the parties' skill at drafting an ironclad agreement, but in their
ability to devise or otherwise locate the proper governance mechanism.
In this instance, the characteristics of the transaction and the nature of the
proposed solution require the parties to devise their own governance
structure. By exploring the institutional detail of that arrangement, this
article has attempted to provide insight into the process of private
government. An understanding of, and sensitivity to, the process of forming
private agreements is important for attorneys, policy analysts, and consultants
alike. Contracting parties are not limited to using formal institutions to
regulate their contracting. Incorrectly assuming that formal institutions are
required can lead attorneys to advise their clients improperly.

